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Highlights 
• The next European Commission’s energy policy should be based 
on six key foundations, able to ensure the achievement of the 2030 
targets and to put the EU on a stable path to full decarbonisation 
by 2050, while also providing an engine in terms of jobs and 
economic growth.
• First, determined action is needed with regards to electricity 
balancing markets to ensure that the increased level of 
intermittency in the electricity market does not provide a 
fundamental break on the development of RES investment.
• Second, “Renewable Energy Apollo Projects” are necessary 
because the EU will not achieve ist 2030 targets on renewables 
on a “business as usual” basis.
• Third, we need to ensure we lay the groundwork for a physical 
electricity grid designed for 2050; that grid will look significantly 
different from that of today and sustained investment is required.
• Fourth, sector coupling represents one of the greatest challenges 
for the next Commission. The ETS is the obvious mechanism to 
drive this change, and the Commission will have to see how to let 
it fulfil its full potential.
• Firth, new digital technologies will open important new 
opportunities. A new regulatory framework is needed to ensure 
that the digital economy, and EVs in particular, can make their 
full contribution to the EU’s decarbonised energy market. 
• Sixth, the next Commission will need to provide the regulatory 
framework and create the investment conditions to enable the 
decarbonised hydrogen market to emerge and grow.
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The following article was prepared in order to provide input by the Florence 
School of Regulation (FSR) into the Commission’s forthcoming deliberations 
on its detailed Work Program for the next legislature and had been addressed 
by the Director of the FSR, Jean-Michel Glachant, to President Von der Leyen, 
EVP Timmermans and Energy Commissioner Simson.
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Introduction
We believe that the next Commission will be deter-
minative for the success or failure of European 
Energy Policy. 
Putting the EU fully on track to achieve the full 
decarbonisation of its energy system by 2050, and 
achieving the 2030 targets, must be considered the 
foundation upon which all else is built. We now have 
the technologies to meet this challenge, although 
some – such as cost-effective hydrogen production 
at scale – are still in their infancy. By meeting our 
2030 targets, putting us on a path to reach our 2050 
goal, creating new technologies and new industries, 
as well as producing our own energy instead of 
importing oil, we can become a beacon to the world. 
If Europe does not play this role, who else will?
Sustainability and decarbonisation, are therefore the 
foundation of our energy policy, and is an obligation 
for the EU rather than an option. But it cannot be 
our sole energy goal. Europe’s energy policy, since 
its inception in the mid-2000’s has always had three 
underlying objectives: (i) sustainability, (ii) security 
and (iii) competitiveness. We must strive to form an 
energy policy that is an ‘equilateral triangle’ of these 
three objectives. 
Since much of the rest of the world are less com-
mitted to dealing with the climate crisis, achieving 
this triangle is difficult. Indeed, decarbonising our 
energy system will raise prices in the short-to-
medium term, but this rise in prices can be limited 
if we plan ahead, invest wisely, and act with determi-
nation to ensure that we reap the benefits – in tech-
nology leadership and exports – that will result. The 
judicious use of trade policy instruments, to protect 
our jobs, can help this change and push others to act 
as well.
But we have to face these challenges, and opportuni-
ties, with our eyes wide open. We cannot ignore the 
challenges ahead that we must overcome if we wish 
to fully decarbonise our energy system. There are 
many such challenges, and they are far from being 
solvable merely on the basis of what we know today.
Without strong leadership from the Commission in 
the next five years, we see a risk that the EU’s global 
leadership in energy policy will falter, as electricity 
prices rise quicker and more significantly than they 
must and this, in turn, risks provoking a reduced 
determination at the national level to push ahead 
with ambition.
Yet, at the same time, it is becoming evident that 
current approaches to energy policy and regulation 
will need to significantly evolve in the next decade to 
meet new challenges. The foundations for this will 
need to be laid now, to create the conditions that will 
drive investment in new technologies.
With this paper, which is built on the findings of the 
EUI Brussels Energy Conference that took place on 
September 12th, we seek to identify what we believe 
are the key priorities for the next Commission, and 
provide our recommendations for achieving them. 
We identify ‘Six Energy Foundations’ for the next 
Commission. These are not intended to be exhaus-
tive – as there are many other actions that will also 
require the Commission’s attention – , but, in our 
view, they represent the most essential priorities. 
Achieving the 2030 Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy Objectives.
With respect to energy efficiency, we can only under-
line the importance of the ‘energy efficiency first’ 
principle. Indeed, simply put, it is the cheapest, most 
effective and most job-creating manner for the EU 
to achieve its decarbonisation objectives and, at the 
same time, to fully address the goals of competitive-
ness and security of supply. 
We note with concern that the Member States’ inten-
tions, as laid out in their draft National Energy and 
Climate Action Plans (NECPs), fail to collectively 
achieve the 32.5% energy efficiency target. Further-
more, the plans themselves fail to provide any con-
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vincing details as to how even their current (lower) 
level of ambition would be achieved.
This concern is exacerbated by the fact that the EU, 
overall, is only close to achieving its 2020 target of 
20% improved energy efficiency because growth in 
energy demand was severely reduced, between 2008 
and 2014, by the economic crisis, and demand in the 
Member States has been creeping up ever since. 
The 32.5% overall EU energy efficiency target 
for 2030 looks close to being ‘on-track’ in terms 
of Member States’ intentions based on the draft 
NECPs, although additional commitment is needed. 
However, this is only because of the very ambitious 
targets sets by some ‘outlier’ Member States such as 
Italy (43%) and Spain (39.6%) which, on the basis 
of the NECPs, look unlikely to be achieved. Fur-
thermore, an examination of all the NECPs demon-
strates a lack of transparency – or future planning – 
by Member States on how they will take the difficult 
concrete actions necessary to achieve their targets, 
which, even if less ambitious than Italy or Spain, 
remain challenging.
We note that the actions that could be character-
ized as the ‘low-hanging fruits’ regarding energy 
efficiency that can be taken at the Community level 
have already been taken, and achieving results in the 
future will be determined by the ability of Member 
States to take often difficult political decisions at 
the national level. Nonetheless, vigilance, transpar-
ency and assisting Member States in achieving their 
objectives will be essential. Therefore, we strongly 
welcome the proposals of the Commission to har-
ness the successor of the EFSI to drive energy effi-
ciency projects forwards.
Regarding renewable energy, we congratulate the EU 
on achieving its 20% target for 2020. The 2030 target 
of 32% means, according to Commission modelling, 
that the EU’s electricity system will need to be on 
average 55% provided by renewable energy by 2030, 
more than 45% of which will come from intermit-
tent sources, notably wind and PV. 
However, having read the National Energy and Cli-
mate Action Plans of the Member States, and wit-
nessed recent developments on the market, we are 
concerned that, unless the Commission takes deci-
sive action right at the beginning of its mandate, we 
will fail to meet both targets.
As mentioned above, since 2014, energy demand has 
been increasing in most Member States. If demand 
had increased at this speed between 2008 and 2014, 
we would not have met our 2020 renewable energy 
targets without far greater efforts. On current 
trends, and without action at the Member State level 
regarding energy efficiency that we fail to see today, 
we expect energy demand to continue to increase, 
making the targets far more difficult to achieve. This 
is an indication of how important action on energy 
efficiency by the Member States is.
To meet the 2030 renewable energy target, we will 
have to install the equivalent of 150% of the wind 
and PV capacity that we will have installed between 
2009 and 2020. Yet, we see ‘onshore wind fatigue’ in 
many countries and increasing planning constraints. 
Above all, we note that the Member States’ National 
Energy and Climate Plans do not contain convincing 
detail on the concrete action that they will take 
achieve their renewable energy targets. 
These factors, combined with the expectation that 
network costs may rise appreciably from 2025 to 
deal with the challenge of an increasing level of inter-
mittent power on the grid (meaning price increases 
for households and industry), give us concern that 
Member States, no longer obliged to meet legally 
binding targets, may be tempted to scale down the 
level of their ambition in the future. This is particu-
larly the case for ‘outlier’ Member States that have 
committed to achieve more than their ‘fair share’ of 
the overall 32% EU objective. 
Specifically regarding network costs, we see the issue 
of balancing the grid becoming increasingly crit-
ical as we move towards the second half of the next 
decade. 
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Germany had 36.2% renewable electricity on average 
at the end of 2017, but already in May 2018, it pro-
duced more than 100% of its electricity requirements 
for the first time. This is now becoming a more 
common occurrence, and Germany currently solves 
the problem by exporting the excess electricity, prin-
cipally to Poland and the Benelux.
On the basis of the National Energy and Climate 
Action plans, we can expect that renewable elec-
tricity will cover the following share of electricity 
consumption by 2030: 
• Belgium, 40.4%;
• Denmark greater than 100%;
• France: 40%;
• Germany 65%; 
• Italy: 55.4%, 
• Netherlands: 66%, 
• Portugal: 80%; and 
• Spain: 74%. 
Given the minimum trajectory required in meeting 
these targets – contained in the Governance Regula-
tion – and assuming that Member States succeed in 
meeting their 2030 RES targets, between 2025 and 
2030, we can expect that the whole region of Cen-
tral Western Europe and Iberia, as well as Italy, will 
have an increasing number of days when PV and 
wind production will significantly exceed 100% of 
demand and, this, probably for sustained periods. 
Since whole regions of the EU (rather than just indi-
vidual countries) will most likely be collectively in 
excess RES production compared to demand during 
periods where sun and wind are plentiful, it will no 
longer be possible to export the electricity to neigh-
bouring countries, although such exports this may 
provide a partial solution for a limited period in 
Central Western Europe. Exports will not, however, 
solve the issue for Iberia or Italy, even in the short 
term.
In any event, it is clear that, as time progresses, more 
regions of the EU will have production surplus – 
above peak demand – from intermittent RES pro-
duction, and for increasing periods. As we move 
towards 2030 and beyond, this is likely to be sys-
temic, and increasingly significant.
On the basis of currently foreseeable technology, 
there are limited options to deal with this ‘RES Peak’ 
issue: (i) demand response (increasing consumer 
demand at specific times), (ii) battery storage (cur-
rently expensive; car battery usage will be crucial 
here [see below]), (iii) hydrogen, produced by elec-
trolysis (currently expensive, even using very low-
cost, otherwise curtailed electricity), (iv) pumped 
hydro storage, and (v) curtailment.  
Leaving aside curtailment, it is clear that all the 
options aside from demand response (which will be 
limited, as it is difficult to increase energy demand, 
even with lower prices), pumped storage, and EV 
daily storage (when we have sufficient EVs and 
appropriate regulatory framework – see below), will 
add very significant costs to the system, once peak 
RES becomes a regular, and important seasonal fea-
ture of EU electricity markets. 
Furthermore, investment signals are not yet in place 
to merit investment in hydrogen storage. These sig-
nals currently exist only to a limited extent regarding 
large-scale battery storage, but there risks to be a 
disincentive to be the first investor because of the 
expected reductions in cost in this technology. 
Therefore, there is a very real chance that there will 
be a shortage of cost-effective storage solutions by 
the mid-to late 2020s. 
If storage solutions are not available, and are not suf-
ficiently competitive, then the most cost-effective 
solution will be curtailment. However, if, already in 
the mid-to late 2020s, we see widespread curtailment 
at peak times, and peak times become an ever more 
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commonplace event, the logic of further increasing 
the level of intermittent RES from that point onwards 
becomes an ever decreasingly valuable proposition.
Thus, if electricity storage, capable of dealing with 
both daily and seasonable imbalances and suffi-
ciently competitive to the alternative of curtailment, 
is not in place by the mid-2020s (and thereafter 
increases to meet demand), growth in RES electricity 
will likely falter. 
This is an issue that needs to be addressed today, 
and determined action to deal with this already now 
should be the first Energy Foundation for the next 
Commission.
Investment in R&D to bring down the cost of 
hydrogen and battery storage will be essential, guar-
anteeing that the EU is at the forefront of techno-
logical development in this area so that we reap the 
industrial benefits from our leadership in dealing 
with the climate crisis. 
The use of storage from electric vehicles (EVs) will 
almost certainly be the cheapest manner to deal with 
daily imbalances, and the Commission needs to 
ensure that the necessary regulatory framework is in 
place for its rapid introduction and, where necessary, 
support this development through research funding 
(see below). 
Building pumped storage is one of the most long-
term cost-effective ways of providing balancing, but 
their lag times and amortization periods are long. 
Furthermore, capital investment costs are high and 
revenue guarantee schemes (but probably not subsi-
dies) will therefore be needed to attract investment, 
and will need to be adapted to purpose, notably with 
respect to the required duration of support. Sus-
tained efforts will be needed by the Commission and 
Member States to explain to citizens why new reser-
voirs are needed to meet the challenge of decarbon-
ising our energy system in an affordable and clean 
manner, thereby facilitating the relevant planning 
procedures.
 We believe that the Commission should consider a 
specific initiative covering all of these issues. Without 
an appropriate regulatory and support framework in 
place in the near term, there is an evident risk that 
the growth in renewable energy investment will 
falter in the latter part of the next decade. Therefore, 
action is urgent now. 
In order to ensure that concrete RES investments 
follow ambitious targets, the Commission has under-
lined in its recommendations on the National Energy 
and Climate Plans the need for concrete, transparent, 
stable and long-term predictable renewable energy 
commitments and programs by the Member States. 
It is vital that this is delivered. 
However, it is very clear that we will not achieve 
this new 2030 ambitious target using a ‘business as 
usual’ model, Unless the EU harnesses some of its 
great renewable energy assets, and above all offshore 
wind, we fear that we will not meet our 2030 goals, 
nor lay the foundations for their continued growth 
to 2050. A piecemeal approach, relying on hundreds 
of thousands of small projects, will not get us there. 
Two of our most valuable renewable energy assets lie 
in the Far North Sea and the Baltic Sea. We have the 
capacity, in these areas, to produce a huge part of the 
energy required to meet our 2030 targets and then 
develop them further to provide the cheap renew-
able power we will need for a fully decarbonised 
system in 2050.
But these projects will require determined action if 
we want them to be achieved cost effectively. They 
require an integrated approach, bringing together 
the assets of different Member States in a coordi-
nated, collaborative manner. The Commission has 
already demonstrated that an integrated approach 
to the infrastructure necessary to develop the North 
and Baltic seas – using a ‘hub and spoke’ type model 
– will save EU citizens billions of Euros compared 
to a project-by-project approach. It now needs to 
deliver on this vision.
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Hundreds of billions of Euros will need to be invested 
in new infrastructure over a 20- to 30-year period, 
and an entirely new regulatory approach will also 
need to be developed. Above all, a new integrated 
offshore electricity network will need to be designed 
on the basis of efficiency and inter-connectivity, not 
national boundaries.
These are the renewable energy Apollo Projects 
of Europe’s energy future and their achievement 
should be the second of the next Commission’s Six 
Energy Foundations. But they will not happen on 
their own. 
To deliver them, the EU will collectively need to 
commit to delivering these projects, developing new 
forms of cooperation between the Member States 
and regulators concerned, and using EU infrastruc-
ture and innovation funding to de-risk the first steps 
towards the achievement of these integrated pro-
jects. The best way to provide this framework is leg-
islation agreed at EU level, relevant to both the Far 
North Seas and the Baltic, as well as future meshed 
grid networks that we cannot predict today. In addi-
tion to strong political commitment to getting these 
projects done, funding through the CEF, the Cross-
Border Renewables fund, the ETS Innovation Fund 
and research funding, combined with a legislative 
framework dealing with the specific and novel chal-
lenges faced by such ‘hybrid’ projects can lay the 
foundations for the rapid development of these pre-
cious European assets.
Equally, the EU’s long-term objectives with respect 
to renewable electricity will not be met without 
additional onshore infrastructure. 
Spain has a 2030 RES objective of 42% (including 
74% renewable electricity), and Portugal has a 47% 
RES target (including 82% renewable electricity). Yet 
Iberia’s interconnection level with France is one of 
the EU’s lowest. Surely Iberia, with huge PV poten-
tial, has the right to participate in Europe’s future 
energy market? 
Equally, it will be essential to bring the renewable 
electricity from the North and Baltic seas to centres 
of electricity consumption, and provide the pos-
sibility for very large scale PV developments in the 
South to reach demand centres, including those in 
the North. Whilst underground HVDC cables offer 
solutions, they are relatively expensive. Realistically, 
however, they will be an equally important part of 
the EU’s long-term future, and investing now to 
start the interconnections that we will need in 10 
to 20 year time – not least to lower the cost of this 
technology – must be one of the next Commission’s 
aims. Ensuring that we lay the foundations for a 
physical electricity grid designed for 2050 should 
be the third of the next Commission’s Six Energy 
Foundations.
Sector Coupling
In our opinion, Sector Coupling represents one of 
the greatest challenges for the next Commission. If 
the Commission succeeds in creating a regulatory 
framework that truly ensures undistorted and trans-
parent sector coupling, it will have put the EU on 
the path to a decarbonised and cost-effective energy 
future that will serve as a beacon for other countries 
to follow.
Sector Coupling in a decarbonised energy market 
means no more than a legal, regulatory and tax system 
whereby all energy sources (wind, PV, nuclear for 
those countries that choose this option, natural gas 
with CCS…) and energy vectors (hydrogen, biofuels 
and gases…) compete with one another in an undis-
torted manner for all sources of energy demand, 
taking account of any residual carbon content and 
non-energy socially relevant considerations (such as 
air pollution, etc).
This is the ‘holy grail’ of energy policies, as it will 
ensure a cost-optimal approach, establish reli-
able energy and ETS prices and thus drive research 
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and development into the most promising options 
moving forward.
The EU’s 2020 renewable energy targets have been an 
overall success. They created mass demand for wind 
and PV at a time when these technologies were far 
from competitive. Although Europe has paid renew-
able energy subsidies and increased electricity prices 
to achieve this, it has been a price worth paying. It has 
led to the industrialisation of wind and PV, driving 
research and economies of scale to the point where, 
correctly situated and regulated, wind and PV are 
the cheapest sources of energy on the planet today. 
Without Europe’s bold vision and action, this would 
not have happened, and certainly not at the breath-
taking speed that it has. Renewable technologies 
would certainly not be seeing the exponential growth 
rates all across the world that we see today, even in 
countries hesitant to embrace action to deal with the 
climate crisis. European citizens should feel proud of 
what we have already achieved.
We support the 2030 renewable energy targets, but 
for different reasons than the one for which the 2020 
targets were needed. ‘Demand push’ through targets 
will have a limited effect in terms of further indus-
trialising production processes and bringing econo-
mies of scale, even if this should not be discounted. 
Rather, the 2030 targets are needed because the ETS 
is not able today to fulfil its real objective: estab-
lishing a truly effective long-term pricing mecha-
nism for carbon and determining which energy 
source and vector should meet demand. 
The ETS does not cover all sectors, and does not 
legally guarantee that CO2 emissions connected 
to the ETS system will be reduced to zero by 2050. 
Therefore, it does not establish the forward prices 
necessary to push investment into decarbonising 
the electricity system through the shift to renew-
able electricity sufficiently quickly, nor justify invest-
ments today into the technologies and markets that 
we will need moving forwards (such as, for example, 
hydrogen technologies). 
Furthermore, current ETS prices are probably 
too low to catalyse the level of investment in wind 
and PV, in the short term, that is physically neces-
sary to enable us to meet our 2050 goals, simply in 
terms of the time, planning and network develop-
ment required to guarantee a high renewable share 
by 2050. Renewable electricity will without a doubt 
form the ‘backbone’ of our electricity system in 2050, 
meeting the ‘lion’s share’ of demand. Thus, at least 
until 2030, the targets are needed to guarantee that 
the renewable energy capacity is in place by 2030 
so that it can act as a ‘springboard’ that will enable 
us then to remove the remaining 60% of the carbon 
from our overall energy system in the remaining 
twenty years. 
However, whilst the targets to 2030 make sense, this 
regulatory driven approach, whereby targets, not 
markets, decide upon the EU’s future energy mix, 
cannot be our long-term future. 
Already by 2030 the EU will have an average of 
around 55% of its electricity from renewable sources, 
and these are intermittent: producing a lot of elec-
tricity when the wind blows and the sun shines, but 
much less so when it does not. As mentioned above, 
this needs balancing, which will bring important 
additional costs into the system.
Post  2030, therefore, we will need the market to 
determine the correct energy balance for Europe. In 
the long-term, a target driven approach will not be 
able to determine the correct balance in our decar-
bonised energy mix between:
1. higher levels of renewable electricity and bio-
mass; 
2. nuclear (for those countries that choose to 
pursue this path);  
3. natural gas combined with CCS; and 
4. hydrogen produced from renewable electricity 
or natural gas (where the resultant CO2 is stored 
through CCS or pyrolysis)
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Furthermore, a target-based approach will also not 
be able to determine the most cost-effective approach 
to balancing.
This is very important. Whilst we cannot exclude 
the need for further renewable energy targets in 
2040 if the ETS price remains too low to ensure 
the continued development of the ’springboard to 
2050’ mentioned above, as a matter of principle, if 
we take a regulatory approach to this rather than let-
ting the market decide the correct long-term balance 
between renewable electricity and other net zero-
carbon energy sources and vectors, we will stifle 
innovation and increase cost.
Establishing an effective sector coupling approach 
is therefore vital; it will need to be the basis of our 
future energy economy. 
However, this is a huge challenge. It will require a 
wholesale rethink of our approach to energy regula-
tion and taxation. It is not correct to think that sector 
coupling simply means removing obvious regulatory 
barriers to hydrogen competing with electricity, and 
EV and battery storage vs other mechanisms, and 
dealing with issues such as unbundling of hydrogen 
networks, important though these issues are.
It means ensuring an undistorted level playing field 
between these different technologies. 
It will require a major reform of regulation with 
respect to the manner that progressively decarbon-
ised gas competes with renewable energy; this is dis-
cussed below, under ‘Gas Decarbonisaion’. 
However, sector coupling goes far beyond this. 
Not least it requires rethinking our tax system, and 
we applaud the intention to revisit the Energy Tax 
Directive. This change will not be simple under cur-
rent EU voting rules on tax, but a medium term 
phased approach, whereby Member States agree to 
gradually evolve energy taxes towards a non-dis-
criminatory ‘sector coupling based’ system should 
be feasible. This could happen over a 15-year period 
for example, giving ample time to take the difficult 
political decisions needed to shift tax patterns in a 
manner that would be imperceptible to citizens and 
directed towards guaranteeing fair energy prices for 
citizens and increasing our competitiveness.
This revision will have to address some fundamental 
issues. For example, we will see electric self-driving 
cars booming in the coming years. Electricity used 
in EVs is typically taxed less than petrol or diesel. 
Taxi drivers pay taxes, the software in self-driving 
cars do not. Electricity typically attracts both envi-
ronmental and social charges, other energy sources 
often do not. The necessary reorientation of taxes 
and revenues will require difficult political choices, 
but this change is a fundamental requirement of an 
efficient decarbonised energy system. 
We therefore encourage the Commission to view 
Sector Coupling as fourth of the six Energy Foun-
dations of the next Commission and, at least, start 
the process that will get us, by 2030, to a non-dis-
torted and transparent energy system that will stand 
the test of time and drive an efficient energy market 
of the future. 
This will ensure a competitive market, drive innova-
tion and set a model for the rest of the world. We 
believe that sector coupling will drive innovation 
in balancing and coupling technologies that we can 
only imagine today, harnessing the storage power of 
car batteries and homes. When the EU takes leader-
ship of this, it will create a driver for export services.
The ETS is the obvious mechanism to drive this 
change, and the Commission will have to see how to 
let it fulfil its full potential.
The imposition of carbon border taxes requires care, 
as they can lead to a loss of competitiveness in down-
stream sectors. For example, if carbon border taxes 
on steel lead to increased EU steel prices, the com-
petitiveness of our car industry can suffer. However, 
a willingness to protect our companies from unfair 
competition from countries not willing to address 
the climate challenge is a valuable tool that can be 
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part of the solution in moving progressively towards 
a truly effective ETS.
The Digital Energy Economy
The EU’s energy market will have to look very dif-
ferent by 2030, yet alone 2050. Electric vehicles and 
batteries in houses will be increasing in importance, 
and this can make a huge contribution in developing 
a cheap and efficient approach to balancing the elec-
tricity network, by using this storage capacity to help 
balance intermittent renewables. 
The electric vehicle (EV) fleet in Europe has grown 
fast over the last 5 years, with compound average 
growth rates of around 80% from 2012–2017. With 
the new EU targets for RES in transport, we can 
expect these growth rates to continue.
On this basis, there is every expectation that within 
a relatively short period, if the legal, regulatory and 
financial mechanisms are in place, the use of EV bat-
tery storage, both from batteries installed in vehicles 
and ‘second life’ batteries, can resolve a very signifi-
cant part of the EU’s daily balancing needs in a highly 
cost-effective manner, and one in which citizens 
participate and benefit. EV batteries, together with 
those installed in homes and offices for example, can 
be used to balance consumption and supply in indi-
vidual houses with PV panels, but more importantly, 
collectively, can be used to balance the grid.
Indeed, the ‘Smart Charging’ of EV batteries can help 
ensure a positive experience for EV drivers (who 
have their EV battery charged at the time needed) 
and, at the same time, help to lower the energy tran-
sition cost for society.
However, delivering such a system in practice is a 
regulatory and technical challenge. Not least because 
it will require data systems that involve potentially 
hundreds of millions of balancing actors that will 
need to be fed into real time balancing systems at the 
DSO level, together with payment and monitoring 
systems.  
At present, several regulatory barriers exist for ‘smart 
charging’ in terms of missing regulation, regulation 
that prevents (or discriminates) against EV storage, 
grid charges that hinder the installation of high 
capacity charging points and tax barriers. Further-
more, regulation differs between EU Member states 
whereas homogeneity in regulation lowers the costs 
for companies to work cross-border.
Equally, the smart meters that we are installing in 
homes enable us to revolutionise the ability of every 
citizen to participate in our decarbonised energy 
system of tomorrow. Citizens will develop new forms 
of participating, from being producers, to suppliers 
of flexibility services, to joining energy communities 
that club together to invest in windmills or PV parks. 
As already mentioned, balancing the electricity grid 
will be one of the greatest challenges in developing a 
cost-effective decarbonised electricity system. To do 
this we will need to harness the most important forms 
of cheap balancing; those that use existing assets. 
Thus, using car batteries for electricity storage on a 
real-time basis, and IT systems to manage demand 
in industry and homes and reward flexibility whilst 
maintaining convenience, will be essential. 
The EU’s leadership of renewable electricity gives 
us a unique chance to develop the IT systems and 
mechanisms that will become the future global 
standard. Whilst this may seem to be a challenge 
for tomorrow, the Commission needs to lead this 
today, ensuring that the existing electricity regula-
tory framework not only permits such systems, but 
actually encourages them. 
These new regulatory approaches will need to be in 
place already by the mid-2020s to limit the increasing 
cost of dealing with peak RES. Where necessary, the 
Commission needs to use its R&D and Innovation 
funds to drive forward the necessary innovation and 
structures that will be required. Accelerating the 
development of the digital energy market is the 
proposed fifth of the Six Energy Foundations.
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We therefore propose that the next Commission 
adopts a specific package of measures ensuring that 
the regulatory framework is rapidly in place to ensure 
that the digital economy – and in this respect the role 
of EVs in particular – can make their full contribu-
tion to the EU’s decarbonised energy market. 
The Hydrogen Economy
There is no longer any academic debate on whether 
hydrogen will form part of the EU’s decarbonised 
energy mix. 
Electricity is too expensive an option for certain 
energy intensive industrial processes and looks ill 
adapted to long-haul transport. Hydrogen will need 
to play a role here. Depending on cost, and the avail-
ability of less expensive options, it is equally likely 
to play some role in storing peak RES electricity on 
a seasonal basis. Furthermore, it is likely to play a 
role in heating buildings (as a complement to heat 
pumps) and, more widely, in transport. Lastly, and 
again depending on its cost compared to available 
alternatives, it may be required as part of the decar-
bonised electricity mix as a complement to RES 
electricity. Finally, it may be simply impossible to 
construct the electricity infrastructure that would 
be needed for us to source almost all of our energy 
requirements from renewable electricity.
As explained above, it is the market that will ulti-
mately need to determine the future EU energy bal-
ance between, for example, RES electricity, biomass, 
nuclear and hydrogen, achieved through sector cou-
pling. But at present, there is a ‘hydrogen investment 
paradox’. 
Whilst it is clear that the EU will need a great deal 
of decarbonised carbon by 2050, there is currently 
no investment case to invest in decarbonised or low-
carbon hydrogen via electrolysis (aside perhaps for 
RES peaking), steam methane reforming combined 
with CCS, nor pyrolysis (converting natural gas into 
hydrogen and CO2 in solid carbon that can be used 
in industrial processes). However, we urgently need 
to invest in hydrogen at industrial scale to bring 
down the cost of decarbonised hydrogen, as today 
it is very expensive and its widespread use in the EU 
energy system would raise prices to an unacceptable 
level compared to competitors located in countries 
failing to deal with the climate crisis.
On the other hand, it will need to form part of any 
decarbonised energy system. Therefore, if the EU 
can lead the way in getting costs down through 
industrialisation, and take leadership of this future 
global industry, it can have profound long-term ben-
efits for the EU.
Thus, creating a regulatory environment that ena-
bles hydrogen to compete equally on the market, 
establishing standards and guarantees of origin, and 
investing heavily in research and development rep-
resents the final of the Six Energy Foundations.
The next Commission will therefore need to provide 
the regulatory framework and create the investment 
conditions necessary to enable the decarbonised 
hydrogen market to emerge and grow, much as it did 
with renewable electricity. This will need to cover a 
myriad of different issues to provide a strong long-
term framework, and the foundations for sector cou-
pling to work effectively.
It will need to cover Guarantees of Origin that dem-
onstrate the CO2 content of any gas, unbundling 
rules regarding the hydrogen network that will 
emerge from the existing gas grid, and gas stand-
ardisation issues to enable the grid to adapt to dif-
ferent forms of hydrogen. Equally, it will need to 
set a framework whereby all forms of low-carbon 
hydrogen, and later only decarbonised hydrogen, 
can compete on a level-playing field.
Above all, it will require a commitment of EU research 
and innovation funding to drive down the cost of 
hydrogen production at scale. This needs to cover 
CCS but should equally focus on pyrolysis, which 
is an emerging and very promising technology, pro-
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ducing the valuable industrial by-product of solid 
graphite. Under the pyrolysis method, hydrogen can 
be produced close to hydrogen demand where CCS 
is unavailable. Given public reluctance to storing 
CO2 on land, pyrolysis looks particularly important 
for the EU’s energy future. 
Although the market must decide which form of 
decarbonised hydrogen is the most competitive, the 
EU needs to invest now, and heavily, in ensuring 
that costs decline rapidly. Once again, if the EU does 
not do this, then who else will? Furthermore, in the 
long-term, there is every likelihood that this invest-
ment will repay itself many times over.
Lastly, the EU needs to decide whether we should 
already push demand for hydrogen, giving a tech-
nology pull to work hand-in-hand with the research 
funding push. This could be done by legislating for 
minimum levels of hydrogen to be blended into nat-
ural gas, through national hydrogen targets in the 
context of the energy Governance mechanism, or by 
taxing grey hydrogen in combination with carbon 
border taxes. Whilst we agree that these represent 
interesting options, their potential economic effects 
need to be considered carefully.
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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
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inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, European socie-
ties and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major 
research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research 
agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European inte-
gration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world.
The Florence School of Regulation 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) was founded in 2004 as a partnership between the Council of the European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) and the European University Institute (EUI), and it works closely with the European Commission. The 
Florence School of Regulation, dealing with the main network industries, has developed a strong core of general regulatory 
topics and concepts as well as inter-sectoral discussion of regulatory practices and policies.
Complete information on our activities can be found online at: fsr.eui.eu
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